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HARMONIZING REGULATIONS IN THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES INDUSTRY THROUGH THE TRANSATLANTIC
TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP
INTRODUCTION
Inconsistent regulation across jurisdictions leads to inefficiencies,
ineffective enforcement, and ultimately the effective deregulation of industries
through jurisdictional shopping. The financial services industry1 is no
exception to this rule and, in fact, could be the poster industry highlighting the
detriment caused by inconsistent regulation. December 2007 marked the start
of the worst worldwide financial crisis since the World War II.2 This financial
crisis was caused by a variety of factors, but ineffective oversight and
inconsistent regulation of the financial services industries in the United States
and the European Union played a very important role in creating the
environment that resulted in the unsound and sometimes criminal financial
practices that contributed to the worldwide recession.3 Harmonizing financial
regulations between the U.S. and the EU will help to provide a more stable,
more profitable, and more sustainable worldwide financial industry.
In July 2013, the United States and the European Union entered into
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).4 If
completed, TTIP will be the largest free trade agreement in the world,
accounting for more than half of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP)
and thirty percent of the world’s trade.5 TTIP, coined the term “Economic
NATO,” which has the potential to spur the global economy out of its current
waning state, strengthen the commitment between two of the world’s largest

1 Financial Services Industry Definition, CENSUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/
naicsrch?code=52&search=2012%20NAICS%20Search (refers to a variety of services provided by different
entities under the Finance and Insurance Sector as defined by the U.S. Department of Commerce. These
include but are not limited to transactions involving the creation, liquidation, or change in ownership of
financial assets and/or in facilitating financial transactions).
2 THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLE DATING COMMITTEE REPORT, 1
(Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf.
3 Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, G20.ORG (Nov. 15, 2008),
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Washington_Declaration_0.pdf.
4 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43158, PROPOSED TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP
(TTIP): IN BRIEF 3 (2013) (hereinafter CRS BRIEF).
5 Id. at 3.
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superpowers, and ultimately become the global standard for many regulatory
issues going forward.6 TTIP has three primary goals: to increase market access
through the elimination of trade barriers; to enhance regulatory coherence and
cooperation; and to develop new rules in the emerging “21st century” areas of
trade.7 These goals apply to almost all sectors of the economy.8 However,
some sectors have been specifically excluded from negotiations, while the
inclusion of others is still in debate.9 The financial services industry is one
sector that, despite both sides’ negotiators expressing their support for
inclusion, is still being debated on each side’s home political landscapes.10 As
such, whether or not financial services will be included in the final agreement
is still very much in the air.11 This Comment will primarily focus on the goal
of enhancing regulatory coherence and cooperation, specifically within the
financial services industry using TTIP as a mechanism for achieving this goal.
TTIP could become the leading example in regulatory cooperation, and
because it would include more than forty percent of the world’s economy,12 the
rest of the world would have no choice but to follow or be left behind. Most
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in the past have been largely concerned with the
reduction of tariffs.13 However, because average U.S. and EU tariffs are
already quite low,14 TTIP’s focus is on non-tariff trade barriers with an
emphasis on the harmonization of regulations between the parties.15 Economic
gains from greater regulatory compatibility could be significant,16 yet many
observers have expressed some skepticism about whether a comprehensive
agreement on regulatory issues between the two sides can be reached.17

6 Trine Flockhart, Can TTIP Be an “Economic NATO”?, GMF BLOG (Oct. 13, 2014), http://blog.gmfus.
org/2013/10/14/can-ttip-be-an-economic-nato/.
7 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 1.
8 See generally id.
9 Id. at 8.
10 See infra Part I.A.
11 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 7–8.
12 WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30608, EU-US ECONOMIC TIES: FRAMEWORK,
SCOPE, AND MAGNITUDE 2 (Apr. 2, 2013).
13 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 6; see generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.Korea., Apr. 1, 2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/finaltext (focusing on the reduction of tariffs between the parties) [hereinafter KORUS].
14 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 6.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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While the U.S. and European negotiators have officially stated their
willingness to include financial services in the TTIP negotiations, several
officials and experts on each side have voiced their concerns about doing
this.18 In particular, the TTIP’s impact on European and U.S. financial reforms
that are currently being implemented in the wake of the financial crisis is of
particular concern.19 For example, U.S. officials are worried that including
financial services in TTIP could effectively end up being a “race to the
bottom” and significantly water down the Dodd-Frank Act.20 U.S. Trade
Representative, Ambassador Michael Froman, specifically declared “that
nothing we do in a trade agreement should undermine the ability of regulators
on both sides to regulate in the public interest.”21 Additionally, Ambassador
Froman emphasized the Administration’s support for the inclusion of financial
services in TTIP, and the need to continue regulatory cooperation in other
venues such as the G-20 and other international bodies in parallel with TTIP.22
In contrast, the European Council’s confidential negotiating instructions,
which were leaked, set encompassing goals for financial services in the TTIP,
calling for a “common framework” that is “binding on all regulators and other
competent authorities.”23 Binding national regulators to the treaty’s new
principles and rules would extend much further than previous trade pacts made
by the U.S.24 “EU negotiators reportedly are weighing proposals for new
requirements to share data among regulators, improve coordination of the
implementation of international financial agreements (such as Basel III on

18 SIMON JOHNSON & JEFFERY SCHOTT, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 1 (2013), available at
http://piie.com/publications/pb/pb13-26.pdf.
19 Id.
20 “Race to the bottom” is a phrase that refers to the lowering of standards in the pursuit of consistency
due to the lack of being able to reach an agreement on more stringent standards. See Race to the Bottom
Definition, FINANCIAL TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=race-to-the-bottom (last visited Dec.
12, 2014). It should be noted that many U.S. companies are actually in favor of including financial services in
hopes that a race to the bottom will occur and it will loosen many of the Dodd-Frank regulations.
21 Readout of Meeting between U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and EU Internal Market and
Services Commissioner Michel Barnier, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP. (July 16, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/press-releases/2013/july/readout-amf-barnier.
22 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 1–2.
23 Directives for the Negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the
European Union and the United States of America, at para. 25, 27, GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL
(June 17, 2013), http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/EU-TTIP-Mandate-from-bfmtvJune17-2013.pdf.
24 See infra Part I.B.
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capital requirements), and restrict the extraterritorial application of financial
regulations, among others.”25
The financial crisis that began in the U.S. banking and financial services
industries caused global financial instability on a scale not seen since The
Great Depression. In response to this crisis, most developed countries have
actively strengthened financial regulations aimed at preventing future
collapses, albeit on different time tables and with different ideas on how to
achieve long term financial stability.26 Several international organizations and
conferences have also been working on these issues as well. These include: the
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (Basel),27 the Financial Markets
Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD),28 the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO),29 the Financial Stability Board (FSB),30 and the G20.31 While these forums are necessary and helpful, the urgency of the
financial crisis has waned along with the urgency to cooperate.32 As a result,
many of the reforms suggested by these organizations are receiving less than
emphatic support by the attending nations.33
TTIP might be able to succeed in financial reform where others have failed
for several reasons. First, fewer participants means fewer competing interests
and thus more ability to reach common ground. Second, the sheer weight of the
entire TTIP agreement will help spur cooperation on contentious issues as
neither side will be willing to toss out the entire agreement based on relatively
minor disagreements in policy.34 Third, the U.S. and EU are significant allies,
thus the talks are less likely to break down over external issues.35
This is not to imply that TTIP lacks significant hurdles in achieving
regulatory harmonization. For example, TTIP negotiations are expected to
25

JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 2.
See infra Part II.
27 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 2.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.; see infra Part II.C (for a more in depth analysis of the reforms currently being discussed in these
forums).
32 See infra Part II.C.
33 Id.
34 See infra Part VI.C.
35 This is not without limitation, as Europe has recently threatened to end the talks if privacy issues are
not addressed as a result of the NSA spying scandal. NSA Spying Threatens to Undermine U.S. Foreign Policy,
Associated Press, Oct. 25, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spying-threatens-to-undermine-u-sforeign-policy-1.2252893.
26
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conclude in December 2014 at the very earliest, with many expecting them to
go much longer.36 Thus, the parties’ internal regulations in conflict with the
TTIP might have to be delayed, upsetting lawmakers on both sides.37 Another
major hurdle of regulatory harmonization is not infringing on the sovereignty
of the states involved and the ability of their regulators to safeguard their own
financial systems.38
In order to achieve significant and meaningful regulatory harmonization,
TTIP will need to address a few major disparities that currently exist as well as
provide a framework going forward that will ensure future consistency,
transparency, and cooperation among regulators. TTIP will need to designate a
common accounting system in order to eliminate the uneconomical
redundancies that occur when multiple states require their own separate and
distinct financial reporting methods. It also needs to identify loopholes in each
side’s regulations that companies currently exploit and then determine a joint
solution in closing them. Another major area that needs to be addressed is
providing safeguards against firms taking unnecessary risks that jeopardize the
global financial system.
In order to achieve these goals, TTIP’s framework should include
guidelines for: the synchronization of existing regulations, regulatory policy
initiation and development, effective regulatory implementation, cross-border
supervision, high transparency standards, and enforcement of the harmonized
regulations.39 Each one of these will help to ensure regulatory harmonization
between the U.S. and EU, as well as spur economic growth through increased
access to transatlantic markets.40 Consistency across borders is best achieved if
cooperation starts at the beginning, facilitates the flow of information between
parties, provides a mechanism for quick and effective implementation, and
gives an effective mode of communication and transparency between
regulators and industry.41
If successful, TTIP will have an immediate and significant global impact.42
The partnership will significantly reduce costs associated with non-tariff trade
36
37
38
39

JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 2.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 2.
INST. OF INT’L FIN., PROMOTING GREATER INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CONSISTENCY 3–4 (June

2013).
40
41
42

See generally id.
See generally id.
See infra Part VI.
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barriers that currently hinder investment, trade, and therefore job
opportunities.43 As a result, TTIP could possibly boost the world out of its
most recent economic downturn.44 TTIP would reinforce the United States’
and Europe’s commitment to each other as critical partners and allies in the
international community. Furthermore, TTIP could serve as the prominent
example of global regulatory cooperation.45 The EU and the U.S. would be the
leaders in global financial regulation, forcing Asia and emerging markets to
follow suit.46
TTIP also has potential negative impacts such as an inequitable distribution
of costs and benefits.47 Some critics say that it might derail contemporary
efforts in the G-20 and Basel conventions and that the bilateral agreement will
leave many stakeholders out with no input on the process.48 Additionally,
regulatory harmonization might slow the already sluggish regulatory process
and prevent governments from reacting swiftly to future crises.49 Despite these
potential negative impacts, the advantages of including financial services in
TTIP will greatly outweigh the disadvantages as long as negotiators take the
right approach and do not cause a “race to the bottom” by eroding current
regulation efforts.
This Comment will provide a brief background and history of the TTIP
agreement and some of the debate surrounding the inclusion of financial
services into the agreement. Then Part II will discuss how the current EU and
U.S. financial regulations that are currently either being implemented or in the
legislative process will not be supplanted by TTIP but instead will either be
reinforced or made even stronger. Part III will shed light on the significant
costs associated with inconsistent regulation and the overall savings that can be
achieved through harmonization. Part IV identifies three major areas where
harmonization can have an immediate and lasting effect on the U.S. and EU
economies. Part V will provide a potential roadmap for achieving regulatory
harmonization through TTIP. Part VI will discuss the global impact of TTIP, if
it is successful in achieving harmonization, and the future of the financial

43

CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 5.
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 For example, depending on what accounting system is approved, firms in the U.S. or EU could face
significant conversion costs to become compliant. See infra Part IV.A.
48 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 5.
49 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 2.
44
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services sector. The Comment will conclude with a summary of the arguments
made.
I. BACKGROUND
TTIP emerged from a summit in November 2011 after U.S. and EU
officials established a High-Level Working Group (HLWG) in an effort to
strengthen the transatlantic economic partnership.50 This part will provide a
basic history of TTIP’s progression from inception to its current status, and a
brief history of U.S. reluctance to include financial services in previous free
trade agreements.
A. History of TTIP
The HLWG was tasked with identifying “policies and measures to increase
U.S.-EU trade and investment to support mutually beneficial job creation,
economic growth, and international competitiveness.”51 On February 11, 2013,
the HLWG issued its final report recommending the immediate need for both
sides to initiate formal domestic procedures necessary to launch negotiations
on a comprehensive trade and investment agreement.52 Two days later, the
Obama administration and European leaders issued a joint statement
announcing their intent to pursue the HLWG’s recommendation.53 One month
later, on March 20, 2013, President Obama notified the U.S. Congress of his
intent to enter into negotiations on a comprehensive trade and investment
agreement with the European Union.54 On June 17, 2013, President Obama and
European leaders announced the first round of negotiations for TTIP would
take place during the week of July 8, 2013.55 The second round of negotiations

50

U.S.-EUR. UNION HIGH LEVEL WORKING GRP. ON JOBS AND GROWTH, FINAL REPORT 1 (Feb. 11,
2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 U.S., EU Announce Decision to Launch Negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Feb. 13, 2013) (statement from U.S. President Barack Obama,
Eur. Council President Herman Van Rompuy, and European Comm’n President José Manuel Barroso),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/february/statement-US-EUPresidents.
54 Letter from Demetrios Marantis, Acting U.S. Trade Representative, to Cong. (Mar. 20, 2013),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/march/administration-notifiescongress-ttip.
55 U.S. President Barack Obama, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, and Eur. Comm’n President José
Manuel Barroso, Remarks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Jun. 17, 2013), available at
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was planned for the week of October 2, 2013; however, due to the U.S.
government shutdown, the talks were postponed until the week of November
11, 2013, followed by the third round during the week of December 16, 2013.56
The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh rounds occurred during the weeks of
March 10, 2014; May 19, 2014; July 14, 2014; and September 29, 2014,
respectively.57 The eighth round has not been scheduled as of November 12,
2014.
After the first week of closed negotiations, officials from both sides began
making remarks regarding the inclusion of financial services in the
negotiations. EU Internal Markets Commissioner, Michael Barnier, began
pushing to include financial regulation in trade talks to avoid haphazard deal
making with different U.S. regulators.58 However, Treasury Secretary, Jacob
Lew “emphasized that prudential and financial regulatory cooperation should
continue in existing and appropriate global fora, such as the G-20, Financial
Stability Board, and international standard setting bodies, consistent with
existing ambitious international timelines,” a Treasury spokeswoman said.59
Secretary Lew also said, “we will not let the pursuit of international
consistency force U.S. to lower our standards.”60 Mr. Barnier countered by
saying he thought the “reticence on the side of the U.S. Treasury” to include
financial services in trade talks was not so much an issue of substance but
rather of “the division of competences between the Treasury and the
independent regulators in the United States.”61
This rift started a flurry of speculation over whether financial services
would ultimately be included in the TTIP negotiations with no real resolution
on the matter as of November 2014. However, other U.S. officials have since
issued statements regarding their support for the inclusion of financial services
into TTIP. On October 30, 2013, U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch stated, “no sector
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/remarks-president-obama-uk-prime-ministercameron-european-commission-pr.
56 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Announcement of Next Round of Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations (Nov. 2013).
57 Readouts from T-TIP Negotiating Rounds, Office of the US Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership/readouts
(last
visited Nov. 13, 2014).
58 Jamila Trindle and Tom Fairless, U.S. Wants Fin. Services Off Table in EU Trade Talks, WALL ST. J.,
(July 15, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323394504578607841246434144.
59 Id.
60 Jack Lew, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Remarks at the 2013 Delivering Alpha Conference Hosted by
CNBC and Institutional Investor (July 17, 2013).
61 Trindle, supra note 58.
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should be excluded from our efforts to enhance regulatory convergence,
including financial services.” Further, he went on to say, “[g]iven the central
importance of the financial sector to every other aspect of industrialized
economies, I do not see how financial services regulation can be excluded from
a meaningful T-TIP agreement.”62 European officials have also stepped up
their rhetoric regarding the inclusion of financial services in TTIP. UK Deputy
Prime Minister Nick Clegg said, “I think it’s essential that financial services
[are] included in a comprehensive TTIP deal.”63 Clegg went on to say that
since the crash in 2008 the regulations created in an effort to safeguard the
world economy have diverged instead of converged, which leaves the whole
system more fragile.64 TTIP, he said, is needed to remedy this divergence and
help to make the system more stable.65 With the increased pressure from
Europe and the support of key officials such as Sen. Hatch, financial services
are gaining ground to be included in TTIP. However, prior to the sixth round,
the U.S. had still not budged in its stance of excluding financial services.66 As
a result, the EU stated its increased pressure by insisting that any issues
regarding market access to financial services in the EU are also off the table.67
While the progress on including financial services in the TTIP agreement has
been less than ideal, it still remains a possibility.
B. Historical Treatment of Financial Services in U.S. FTAs
The historical treatment of financial services in FTAs plays an important
part as to why U.S. officials have been reluctant to include the harmonization
of regulations within TTIP. Unlike other traditional FTAs—such as the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA),68 the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA),69 the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement
(KORUS),70 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) from
the World Trade Organization (WTO)71—TTIP hopes to increase market
62 The Transatlantic Trade and Inv. P’ship: Achieving the Potential: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on Fin.).
63 Nick Clegg, U.K. Prime Minister, TTIP and the Fifty States Conference (Sept. 24, 2013).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 James Crisp, Financial services off the table at next round of TTIP talks, EURACTIV (June 16, 2014),
http://www.euractiv.com/Parts/euro-finance/financial-services-table-next-round-ttip-talks-302808.
67 Id.
68 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter CUSFTA].
69 NAFTA, supra note 13.
70 KORUS, supra note 13.
71 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
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access and eliminate non-tariff trade barriers through the harmonization of
regulations.72 Whereas in the past, FTA provisions on financial services were
merely an extension of most favored nation (MFN) treatment.73 They allowed
market access but did not remove or even attempt to reconcile differing
policies that proved to be significant barriers to entry into the market because
of their cost to foreign firms.74 For example, in CUSFTA the financial services
“terms allowed mutual access to each other’s markets, subject to ‘normal
regulatory and prudential considerations’ (Article 1702, paragraph 4).”75 In
other words, CUSFTA merely let U.S. and Canadian financial firms operate in
one another’s markets, but there was no attempt whatsoever to harmonize
regulations in each market.
NAFTA, ratified in 1994, was the first to even provide the opportunity for
regulatory harmonization though it did not require it.76 Article 1406:2 provided
that “[a] party may recognize prudential measures of another Party or of a nonParty,”77 but Article 1410:1 allowed prudential measures by each country to
strengthen the safety, integrity, and stability of financial firms and the broader
financial system.78 Both GATS and KORUS followed in the spirit of NAFTA
by providing discretionary harmonization.79 GATS and KORUS, while
including more extensive MFN and national obligations, specifically carry a
very broad prudential exemption that effectively renders any of these
obligations moot with any vague reasoning for safety, soundness, integrity, or
financial responsibility to individual institutions.80 Again, although one Party
has claimed its institutions are safe due to its own regulations, it does not
prevent the other Party from imposing its own regulations on the other Party’s
companies.81
By following the example set in NAFTA in its other FTAs, the U.S. has
been able to safeguard its financial industries by requiring more stringent
regulations within the U.S. that place U.S. firms in a better position in regards
to compliance, because international firms may lack restrictions in their home
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

JOHNSON & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. See CUFTA, supra note 68.
NAFTA, supra note 8.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
See generally GATS, supra note 71; KORUS, supra note 13.
JOHNSON & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 3.
Id.
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country.82 Additionally, U.S. firms can more easily open shop in a country
with fewer regulations. In other words, the NAFTA and GATS model for
financial services has been extremely favorable to the U.S. and its firms, which
is one significant reason for the reluctance in broader regulatory
harmonization.83 However, with TTIP, the U.S. is not dealing with developing
countries’ immature regulatory schemes. Instead, it is dealing with Europe’s
mature and robust regulatory scheme, which contains some standards that
might be considered even stronger than the U.S.’s. As a result, with TTIP, the
U.S. has an opportunity not only to increase its GDP but also its chance to
become the de facto world standard by harmonizing its regulations with the
EU.
II. CURRENT U.S. AND EU FINANCIAL REGULATION
Since the crash of 2007, the U.S. and the EU have implemented or are in
the process of implementing sweeping financial regulations aimed at
safeguarding against future global crises. This Part will broadly summarize the
main pieces of legislation that are particularly relevant to the harmonization of
financial regulations. First, it will discuss major changes in U.S. legislation and
in particular the Dodd-Frank Act. Second, it will highlight the reforms taking
place within the EU. Last, it will discuss the reforms that are being discussed
in other global forums, such as the G-20.
A. US Regulations
The U.S. passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.84 The Dodd-Frank Act
implements a variety of changes. The Act creates the Consumer Protection
Financial Bureau to ensure consumers get clear and accurate information when
purchasing a variety of financial products.85 Dodd-Frank creates the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to look out for the next big problem and
address systemic risks within the financial industry.86 The Act ends “Too Big
to Fail” bailouts by explicitly stating that taxpayers will not be responsible for

82

See generally CUSFTA, supra note 68; GATS, supra note 71; KORUS, supra note 13.
JOHNSON & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 4.
84 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5301 (2010).
85 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, 111TH CONG., BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2–3 (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/
public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf.
86 Id. at 3–4.
83
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bailing out failing financial companies.87 Dodd-Frank implements the Volcker
Rule to prohibit conflicts of interest between banks and hedge funds.88 The
FSOC can extend regulation to non-banks by requiring at-risk firms to submit
to supervision by the Federal Reserve.89 The Act creates transparency and
accountability in the derivatives market by closing regulatory gaps, requiring
central clearing, and creating a higher standard of conduct.90 It reforms the
mortgage industry by prohibiting unfair lending practices, ensuring the
borrower’s ability to pay, and establishing penalties for irresponsible lending.91
Last, it empowers regulators to aggressively pursue fraud, and other
misdeeds.92 This list is by no means comprehensive. However, it highlights
some of the larger provisions in the bill. The majority of these changes have
not been implemented as of July 2013.93 In fact, the U.S. House of
Representatives has passed eight bills in this year alone that would roll back
certain provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.94
B. EU Regulations
In response to the financial crisis, the European Commission established
the High-Level Expert Group on Bank Structural Reform in 2012, whose
findings became known as the Liikanen Report.95 The EU has introduced the
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), increasing the stability of
the derivative markets,96 and the Capital Requirements Directive and
Regulation (CRD IV), raising capital requirements to levels suggested in
BASEL III.97 Other reforms are in the process of being finalized, such as the
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Id. at 5–7.
Id. at 5.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 8.
91 Id. at 8–9.
92 Id. at 2.
93 See Donna Borak, Regulators Still in Dodd-Frank Quagmire Three Years Later, AM. BANKER
(July 19, 2013), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_139/regulators-still-in-dodd-frankquagmire-three-years-later-1060744-1.html.
94 Eric Lipton, House Votes to Repeal Dodd-Frank Provision, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2013), available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/house-passes-bill-on-derivatives/?_r=0.
95 ERKKI LIIKANEN ET AL., HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU
BANKING SECTOR: FINAL REPORT 1 (Feb. 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/
high-level_expert_group/liikanen-report/final_report_en.pdf.
96 Id. at 74.
97 Id. at 69.
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Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II),98 increasing
consumer protection,99 and the proposed directive on Bank Recovery and
Resolution (BRR),100 addressing “Too Big To Fail” recovery options.101
Additionally, the UK has developed its own version of the Volcker Rule in its
“Vickers Report” which is now part of the Financial Services (“Banking
Reform”) Act 2013.102 Implementation of the major recommendations of the
Liikanen Report was adopted by the European Commission in the Proposal on
Banking Reform on January 29, 2014.103 Many of the rules in the Proposal are
variations on the U.S. and UK rules that have been implemented. These
include a version of the Volker Rule, prohibiting proprietary trading,104 a rule
to eliminate “Too Big To Fail” banks,105 rules regulating “Shadow
Banking,”106 and a rule to potentially separate certain trading activities.107 As
the EU just passed this proposal, it is in an earlier stage in implementing its
financial reforms in response to the crisis. The majority of the proposal’s
provisions will enter into effect in June 2015, but some will not be
implemented until 2018.108 The EU is on a similar path as the U.S. and still has
time to catch up, as long as the U.S. continues to delay the implementation of
the major provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.

98 Directive 2014/65/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 On Markets In
Financial Instruments And Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173)
(349).
99 LIIKANEN ET AL., supra note 95, at 74.
100 Directive 2014/59/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Establishing a
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC,
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No
648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 191.
101 LIIKANEN, supra note 95, at 74.
102 THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING: THE VICKERS REPORT, 2013, H.C. SN06171, at 7
(U.K.).
103 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Structural Measures
Improving the Resilience of EU Credit Institutions, COM (2014) 43 final (Jan. 29, 2014).
104 Id. at 7–8.
105 Id. at 52.
106 Id. at 3. “Shadow Banking” is defined as “the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and
activities outside the regular banking system.” Id.
107 Id. at 8.
108 Id. at 12.
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C. International Forums’ Reforms
Both the U.S. and the EU are members of the G-20, Basel, FMRD, FSB
and IOSCO.109 These forums have been working toward global financial
reform.110 While some international cooperation is occurring, the urgency of
the financial crisis has waned and with it so has the urgency to cooperate.111 As
a result, many of the reforms suggested by these forums are receiving less than
emphatic support by the attending nations.112 The reforms that have been
supported and passed by these organizations have significantly less teeth than
the reforms being implemented by the U.S. and the EU. For example, the Basel
III agreement set minimum requirements for equity capital using standardized
measures.113 It also allowed countries to raise requirements for firms
considered to be of systemic importance.114 However, the U.S. has already
adopted a leverage ratio above the Basel III minimum.115 Additionally, as a
report to the G-20 by the BCBS in October 2012 acknowledged, “there is a
high probability that just six of the 29 global systemically important banks
identified by the FSB in November 2011 will be subject to Basel III
regulations from the globally agreed start date.”116
Though precedent was made in 2008 with thirty-six recommendations
adopted by G-20 leaders was made through the agreed international agenda for
action that overlooks the entire financial system, 117 as FSB noted,
[d]elays in adopting legislative and regulatory frameworks are
contributing to regulatory uncertainty, which remains a significant
obstacle to further market implementation of the G20 commitments.
This uncertainty is compounded by the potential for conflicts,
inconsistencies, duplication and gaps in the application of
jurisdictions’ rules to cross-border activity. The incomplete state of
109 See id. at 2, Basel Committee Membership, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Nov. 17, 2014), http://
www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm, Ordinary Members of IOSCO, OICU-IOSCO (Nov. 17, 2014), http://
www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm?alpha=u&orderBy=jurSortName&memid=1, Associate Members
of IOSCO, OICU-IOSCO (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm?alpha=e&order
By=jurSortName&memid=2, Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S.–EU Financial Markets
Regulatory Dialogue Joint Statement (July 11, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/jl2564.aspx.
110 Id.
111 INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 1.
112 Id. at 2.
113 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 8.
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 INSTITUTE OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 14.
117 Id. at 13.
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development of regulatory proposals in most jurisdictions, including
the lack of preliminary guidance in almost all FSB jurisdictions
regarding the approach to cross-border activity, makes it more
difficult to assess the extent to which any such cross-border issues in
regulatory reforms might frustrate jurisdictions’ collective
achievement of the G20 goals.118

Thus, while these international organizations have certainly made progress
never before seen on the global or international level, the progress is not on the
scale or the timeline needed to ensure global financial stability. In fact, many
of the reforms identified by these organizations are not expected to be fully
implemented until 2019.119 Secretary Lew’s comments after the first round of
TTIP discussions are somewhat surprising considering the lack of actual
results achieved in these international forums.120 His overall commitment to
completing the Dodd-Frank reforms by the end of 2013 is expected, although
at this point not likely. Instead of viewing TTIP as a threat to the
implementation of Dodd-Frank, Secretary Lew could have seen it as an
opportunity to implement the much stronger Dodd-Frank rules on a much
larger scale. If TTIP negotiators were willing to have a race to the top (instead
of the bottom), the U.S. and the EU could agree on a framework that would
result in the strengthening of financial reforms for both sides. TTIP could then
provide the negotiating power in these other international forums that could
impose a stronger approach and a quicker timeline than currently exists.
III. COSTS OF INCONSISTENT REGULATION
The financial crisis underlined the significance of interdependent global
markets and the need for international consistency in financial regulations.
Inconsistency has proven to have significant costs across the board. Financial
instability, increased costs to financial institutions, and increased costs to end
users of the financial industry all occur due to inconsistencies in cross-border
regulations.121 Part III will discuss each of these costs in detail, which will help
identify exactly what areas harmonization can help reduce significant costs in
the financial services industry.

118

FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: FIFTH PROGRESS REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION 4 (Apr. 15, 2013), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_
130415.pdf.
119 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 15.
120 See supra Part I.
121 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 9–11.

BICKEL GALLEYSPROOFS2

572

1/22/2015 12:18 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

A. The Costs of Financial Instability
Inconsistencies in regulatory measures reduce capital, increase risk, and
ultimately undermine the stability of the global financial market.122 For
example, international banks are currently forced to hold differing amounts of
dedicated capital at many different locations across jurisdictions instead of
being able to manage all branches from a centralized location.123 This ends up
reducing the amount of capital that can be introduced into the financial
system.124 Regulatory agencies face a much more difficult task in assessing the
risks and vulnerabilities of both national and global markets due to diverging
financial reporting requirements.125 Additionally, the lack of cross-border
interagency cooperation and coordination causes a serious deficit in detecting
risks in international firms and the global market as a whole.126 Most
importantly of all, because financial crises are inevitable, the ability of national
authorities to respond swiftly, decisively, and effectively to a global financial
crisis is of paramount importance.127 Unfortunately, inconsistency severely
hinders this ability as can be evidenced by the ongoing fractured responses
from countries around the world to the latest crisis nearly seven years later.128
B. Increased Costs to Financial Institutions
Inconsistent regulations serve as a significant barrier to entry into new
markets for firms wanting to branch out internationally.129 They cause
significant increases in costs due to the need to comply with two or more
different sets of rules,130 giving domestic firms a distinct competitive
advantage of lower operating costs.131 For example, a U.S. company that only
competes in U.S. markets only has to comply with the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) because that is the accounting standard in the
U.S.,132 whereas a firm that competes in both the EU and the U.S. must comply
122

Id. at 15.
Id. at 9.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 10.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See supra Part II.
129 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 9–12.
130 Id. at 10.
131 Id.
132 Chris Dumont, International Financial Reporting Standards: What You Need to Know, INVESTOPEDIA
(Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental-analysis/12/international-financialreporting-standards.asp.
123
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with GAAP and with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).133
This not only costs firms significant amounts to maintain two separate versions
of their books but also hurts investors trying to reconcile the two sets of
books.134 As a result, international firms are not as competitive, and the
inconsistent information could cause the firm to lose investors, widening the
gap between domestic and international firms even more. Further, regulators’
inconsistent responses to potential international conflicts of regulation can
make it extremely difficult for firms to plan ahead.135 Additionally, multiple
reporting requirements often require more one type of IT or data collection
system, which on their own have significant costs, but perhaps the biggest cost
comes from the inability to accurately reconcile these systems, resulting in
decisions based on imperfect or incomplete information.136 All of these costs
result in fewer firms participating in foreign markets, which results in lost
opportunities and revenue for international firms.
C. Increased Costs to End Users
For end-users, insufficient consistency leads to reduced choice and higher
costs. All the firms that decided to stay out of or leave foreign markets means
less choice, reduced competition and higher prices for domestic consumers.137
Investors face many of the same problems as consumers. They will have fewer
choices in companies to invest in domestically along with the added problem
of having to navigate multiple regulatory landscapes, accounting standards,
and disclosure requirements of those international firms that do enter or stay in
the market.138 If firms have difficulty in reconciling their own information,
investors have much more difficulty evaluating this information and making
sound investments.139 This results in less investment as a whole and again
means higher costs for the funding that is available to firms.

133 WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING
STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS: FINAL STAFF REPORT 22, U.S. SEC.
EXCH.
COMM’N.
(July
13,
2012)
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
AND
globalaccountingstandards/ifrs-work-plan-final-report.pdf (providing an in depth comparison of the two
systems) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT].
134 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 10.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 11.
137 Id. at 10.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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The IIF report aptly noted that, “[m]ore work needs to be done to assess the
magnitude of these costs and their individual and cumulative impact but even
without such analysis, it is clear that these effects are at the very least high,
undesirable, and a deadweight loss to national economies and the global
economy.”140 International regulatory inconsistency ultimately causes systemic
inefficiencies in the financial services marketplace hurting everyone except the
protected domestic firms who have no interest in international expansion.
Harmonization of regulations through TTIP will help to eliminate and reduce
these inefficiencies which will boost both the domestic and global economies
for years to come.
IV. MAJOR AREAS THAT NEED HARMONIZATION
Part III addressed the costs of divergent regulations on trading partners.
Part IV will focus on specific areas of regulation that if harmonized could
drastically reduce those costs. The first area that needs harmonization is a
common accounting standard. The second involves closing existing loopholes.
Finally, the third area where harmonization is drastically needed is
safeguarding against unnecessary risks. If TTIP can address these major issues
and provide a framework for the future, it will make a serious impact on global
financial stability, solidify the U.S. and EU positions in the global economy as
the standard setters, and provide additional benefits discussed in further detail
in Part VI.
A. Convergence into a Single Accounting Standard
Two major accounting standards currently exist in the modern financial
world.141 GAAP is only used as a regulatory standard in the U.S.,142 but
because of the U.S. domination in global financial services, it is an absolutely
necessary standard for firms wishing to compete in U.S. markets and those
wishing to entice American investors.143 The IFRS on the other hand is an
international standard that was created by the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB), an independent organization comprised of sixteen

140
141
142
143

Id. at 11.
See supra Part III (discussing GAAP and IFRS).
Dumont, supra note 132.
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 133.
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members from various nationalities including the U.S. and EU.144 The IFRS
has been adopted by more than 100 countries, including all of those within the
EU.145 While many similarities exist between the two standards, there are also
significant differences that can result in large disparities in reporting income
and expenses.146 For example, the IFRS does not allow certain inventory
methods, and certain development costs must be capitalized as opposed to
expensed under GAAP.147
As mentioned in Part III, divergence in accounting standards is a major cost
and burden to the global financial industry. Not only does it result in additional
costs to international firms, it significantly hinders investors’ ability to
properly evaluate firms in other markets.148 Since 2002, the IASB and the U.S.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)149 have been working together
toward achieving convergence between IFRS and GAAP.150 The G-20
reaffirmed this commitment to convergence in January 2013, when it called on
standard setters to “set out by the end of 2013 their plans for achieving
convergence on high-quality standards.”151
The G-20, however, is not a binding organization, and as such, the
accounting-standard push has hit a wall with the U.S.152 In July 2013, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released its final staff report on
global accounting-standard convergence.153 In its report, the SEC staff cited
several areas in which the accounting approaches diverge, such as impairment
models for property, plant, and equipment, as well as inventory and intangible
assets.154 The significant expense that both large and small companies could
144 About the IFRS Foundation and IASB, IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Pages/IFRSFoundation-and-the-IASB.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2014); see also Members of the IASB, IFRS.ORG, http://
www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/Members/Pages/Members-of-the-IASB.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
145 Paul Pacter, Global Accounting Standards—From Vision to Reality, THE CPA J. 6 (Jan. 2014),
http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/Publication/Documents/2014/CPA_Journal_Global_Accounting_Standards_January
_2014.pdf.
146 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 133, at 14–17.
147 Id.
148 See supra Part III.
149 The FASB is the governing body in charge of setting the standards in GAAP. Facts about the FASB,
FASB, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/PartPage&cid=1176154526495 (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).
150 Convergence between IFRSs and U.S. GAAP, IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/
Global-convergence/Convergence-with-US-GAAP/Pages/Convergence-with-US-GAAP.aspx (last visited
Oct. 29, 2014).
151 INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 16.
152 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 133.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 14–17.
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incur in any switch from GAAP to IFRS was also a sticking point.155 The staff
noted, “[m]any of the issuers indicated that the costs of full IFRS adoption
could easily be among the most significant costs ever required from an
accounting perspective.”156
The EU should use TTIP to make the U.S. commit to the IFRS. In general,
TTIP negotiations on financial services should not focus on specific regulatory
measures, as they are too complex and detailed for this type of agreement.
However, the accounting standard is one specific regulatory measure that
definitely should be included in the negotiations. TTIP should be used to force
the SEC’s hand in the matter; even though the initial conversion cost for U.S.
firms may be high, the overall net gain to the U.S. economy will be much
greater.
B. Closing Loopholes in Existing Financial Regulations
Both parties have loopholes in their existing regulatory regimes that have
been exploited over the years, and as long as there are regulations, lawyers will
keep finding new loopholes to jump through that game the system. The
financial crisis of 2008 is a prime example of firms exploiting gaps in
regulatory scheme. Financial institutions developed new products that, while
not illegal, helped them mask their risky investments and then sold them to
unwitting third parties.157 Both the EU and the U.S. have passed legislation and
are currently in the process of implementing new rules that will hopefully
prevent this from occurring in the future.158 Using TTIP to harmonize these
new rules will provide regulators with the best opportunity to prevent future
abuses. First, harmonization will prevent firms from jurisdictional shopping
between the two largest financial markets in the world. For example, if the EU
implements a rule that is more favorable to financial firms with less protection
for the consumer, then many large firms might relocate to Europe; in an effort
to regain competiveness, the U.S. would have to lower its standards. This back
and forth would continue until it was a “race to the bottom,” resulting in

155

Id. at 3.
Id.
157 Although illegal actions definitely contributed to the collapse, some of the methods used by these
institutions were completely legal under the regulatory system at that time. See Origins of the Financial Crisis:
A Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/
21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article (outlining the many causes of the crash,
both legal and illegal).
158 See supra Part II.
156
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effective deregulation.159 However, harmonization with the full intent to keep
the best parts of each side’s new regulations will result in stronger, safer, and
more effective regulations.
C. Safeguarding Against Unnecessary Risk Taking
As previously mentioned in Part II, financial institutions made extremely
risky investments on such a large scale, that the entire world economy was
brought to its knees when those investments failed.160 While the current
reforms being implemented are addressing some of those risks,161 it will only
be a matter of time before firms find loopholes in those regulations and exploit
them. Harmonization and cooperation among the regulators in the U.S. and the
EU should be able to identify and manage future risks and loopholes better
than without such action. One, they will have more resources combined than
either will ever have on its own. Two, they will have only one set of
harmonized rules to analyze as opposed to two. Three, they will be able to
share best practices that will make them more efficient at doing so.
V. HOW TO ACHIEVE REGULATORY HARMONIZATION THROUGH TTIP
The real challenge that TTIP faces in harmonizing financial regulations is
how to implement a process that will yield meaningful cooperation between
the U.S. and the EU without infringing on the sovereignty of either party. Part
V will discuss potential solutions that the TTIP negotiators should consider
when drafting the final agreement. The Institute of International Finance (IIF)
developed a sixteen-point plan that would facilitate greater international
regulatory consistency.162 This Part draws on this plan and applies many of the
concepts in the specific context of TTIP instead of a general global manner.
First, it will discuss ways in which TTIP can facilitate the synchronization of
existing regulatory policies. Second, it will establish guidelines for regulatory
policy initiation and development. Third, it will provide a method for
regulatory implementation. Fourth, it will discuss possible avenues for crossborder supervision. Fifth, it will discuss the need for transparency standards.
Last, it will discuss the enforcement mechanism.

159
160
161
162

INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 8; see also JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 6–7.
See Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 157.
See supra Part II.
INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 1.
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A. Synchronization of Existing Regulatory Policies
TTIP should create a bilateral independent commission (BIC)163 charged
with evaluating each party’s existing financial regulations and the disparities
between the two. This commission should consist of top regulators from both
sides and should have an aggressive schedule of deadlines to ensure progress
in major areas of divergence. Additionally, this committee should identify key
loopholes in their regulations that firms exploit and come up with a joint
solution to close them. This commission should also serve as the starting point
for new regulations and standards. BIC should also identify appropriate
standard setters for the various areas of financial regulations such as the IASB
for the accounting system.
TTIP should get a binding commitment from the U.S. to convert to the
IFSR on a strict timeline that will provide adequate time for the conversion.
Negotiating this directly within the TTIP agreement will provide the EU with
more negotiating power and will not allow such a large and important
divergence to continue. The U.S. is on the IASB and thus can lobby for
changes in the rules through the appropriate forum during its implementation
phase.164 If the U.S. agrees to do this then it may bargain for a more favorable
stance elsewhere in the agreement that might be able to subsidize the
transition.
B. Guidelines for Regulatory Policy Initiation and Development
“Consistency is easiest to deliver if right from the start there is a common
analyses of the risks and how to address them rather than after national
regulators have developed their own approaches.”165 BIC should establish best
practices guidelines for national regulators to use in identifying and addressing
emerging risks and concerns.166 Not only will this foster and encourage
cooperation between the U.S. and EU regulators, but it will also enhance

163 This acronym serves only as a generic placeholder name for the hypothetical commission and is not
meant to represent any existing entity or organization.
164 “The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an independent group of 14 experts with an
appropriate mix of recent practical experience in setting accounting standards, in preparing, auditing, or using
financial reports, and in accounting education. Broad geographical diversity is also required.” International
Accounting Standards Board, IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/Members/Pages/Members-of-theIASB.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). Three of these experts are from the U.S., two former SEC employees
and one former FASB member. Id.
165 INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 20.
166 Id. at 19.
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communication through a common regulatory language and approach to
problems. When these concerns arise, BIC should answer the following
questions to determine the appropriate remedy: is a common or national
approach needed; what is the regulation’s priority; and what are the impacts of
the proposed regulation.167 If it is determined that a national approach is
needed instead of a common approach, BIC should serve as an intermediary
between the two national systems to mitigate possible divergences and assess
any external impacts of the regulation.168 BIC and national regulators should
work towards regulations that effectively balance international consistency and
local flexibility.169 This balance should be considered when determining
whether a minimum or maximum harmonization approach is taken with
respect to the proposed regulation.170 All proposed regulations or standards
should have comprehensive impact assessments completed to determine the
effects on both the micro- and macro-economic levels.171 BIC should set
appropriate deadlines for agreement based on the urgency and priority of
proposed regulations.172
C. Regulatory Implementation
BIC should provide national agencies with detailed interpretations that
facilitate mutual understanding and recognition between jurisdictions.173 This
will help to prevent inconsistent outcomes across jurisdictions and eliminate
uncertainty within international firms. National regulators must buy into the
system. They must communicate and coordinate with BIC throughout the
implementation process in order to prevent unilateral divergence.174 If national
regulators identify fundamental problems in international standards, they
should notify BIC of the issue and work together to find appropriate solutions
that preserve cross-border consistency as much as possible.175 If it is
determined that exceptions or extensions need to be unilaterally applied then
they should be approached with a collaborative effort to limit the divergence.
BIC should create a system to catalog all financial services regulations,

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
See id.
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interpretations, and standards of all parties.176 This system must be easily
accessible by national regulators and will help to identify and prevent
conflicting regulations. National regulators and BIC should work together to
identify and report any material inconsistencies between national and
international standards.177 BIC should have a forward looking approach that
focuses on long-term regulatory consistency that will safeguard and promote
sustainable financial prosperity.178
D. Cross-border Supervision
In order to effectively detect risks and coordinate swift and appropriate
responses to these risks, regulators must have access to data about both a firms
local and international operations.179 Without this information, a firm might be
able to hide significant risks from one or any number of regulators. Because of
this potential to mask risk, it is imperative that BIC identify any unnecessary
barriers to cross-border sharing of data and information between regulators.180
However, BIC should place an emphasis on protecting proprietary information
and high data protection standards, while eliminating excessive barriers to data
sharing between regulators.181 Regulators must communicate with each other
and BIC to ensure decisions in any jurisdiction are understood by all, so as to
promote coordination and consistency.182 BIC should be able to appoint crisis
management groups that consist of top regulators in the various areas of
financial services.183 These groups should meet regularly to identify potential
crisis areas and develop preventative and reactionary plans to promptly correct
financial crises. BIC should periodically examine the effectiveness of interagency communication and address any problem areas if they arise.184
E. Transparency Standards
Because TTIP would be the first agreement of its kind to achieve such a
high level of regulatory harmonization, transparency in rule-making,
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See id.
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implementation, and enforcement is absolutely necessary.185 In order to
preserve an appropriate level of transparency, most actions of both national
regulators and BIC should be within the public purview and subject to scrutiny.
Throughout the regulatory and supervisory process, BIC should be open to
input from industry leaders, consumers, and other stakeholders.186 Indeed, BIC
should have regular meetings with industry advisory committees, consumer
protection groups, and national lawmakers to discuss economic and regulatory
issues.187 Additionally, BIC should have continuous interaction with other
global standard setters such as the G-20, BASEL, and others.188 This will not
only help it stay on top of other global trends but also help to exert its
influence on those trends.
F. Enforcement
Enforcement of these regulations should follow the procedure of each
party’s established court system. A collaborative effort to harmonize mutually
beneficial regulations will not infringe on nations’ abilities to enforce their
own laws, because the harmonization is not all-encompassing. A collaborative
effort to harmonize mutually beneficial regulations and will not infringe on the
ability of nations to enforce their own laws. Therefore, all enforcement actions
must be solely up to the party whose regulation was violated. If a firm violates
regulations in multiple jurisdictions, then it can be held liable in every
jurisdiction.
If followed, the six suggestions could provide an adequate base for
regulators to effectively harmonize U.S. and EU financial regulations in a
timely manner so that gains discussed in the next section can be realized.
These are mere suggestions, however, and are by no means the only way to go
pursue harmonization. The negotiation process will surely foster other
innovative and effective options for successfully harmonizing regulations. This
Part shows a potential path towards realizing significant gains through the
reduction of non-tariff barriers.

185
186
187
188

Id. at 26.
Id. at 26–27.
See id.
See supra Part II.C.
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VI. GLOBAL IMPACT IF TTIP IS SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED AND RATIFIED
TTIP will provide wide-ranging and lasting effects on the global economy,
the global power and political structure, as well as substantial gains to
individuals throughout the U.S. and the EU. Part VI will discuss economic
gains to the U.S. and EU as a result of harmonization in the financial industry,
then address the impact to individual companies, investors, and consumers in
the U.S. and EU. Next, it will look at the impact on the US/EU political
landscape and how that will affect the rest of the global political arena. Finally,
Part VI will discuss some of the opposing arguments that critique the impacts
of TTIP.
A. Economic Gains for the U.S. and EU
In terms of the economic impact, a variety of studies have been completed
that project the overall impact to the U.S., EU, and global economies. One of
particular note is a study by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR),
a leading independent pan-European economic research organization.189 The
CEPR study falls very near the middle of all studies in terms of projected
economic gains.190 The CEPR predicts that TTIP will increase the size of the
EU economy by €120 billion (0.5% of GDP) and the U.S. economy by €95
billion (0.4% of GDP).191 These increases would be a permanent increase that
would occur every year.192 These increases are across all sectors that are
currently included in the TTIP negotiations.193
The study goes in depth in all of the sectors identified. Specifically, for the
financial services sector, the study points out that Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)
(which include regulatory divergence) are the major cause for increased costs
between the EU and the U.S.194 The study found that the cost increases
attributed to NTBs result in an effective tax rate of 11.3% in EU barriers to
U.S. exports and 31.7% in U.S. barriers to EU exports.195 The study goes on to
189 EUROPEAN COMM’N, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Economic Analysis
Explained 2 (Sept. 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151787.pdf [hereinafter
Economic Summary].
190 Id. at 3.
191 Id. at 2.
192 Id.
193 See CTR. FOR ECON. RESEARCH, Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An
Economic Assessment 56 (Mar. 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf
[hereinafter Economic Assessment].
194 See id. at 16.
195 Id. at 19.
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assume that if TTIP would be able to eliminate approximately 25% of these
NTBs through harmonization and convergence of regulations, then financial
services alone could add €3.8 billion to Europe’s economy and €7 billion to the
U.S. economy.196 Again this study prefers to err on the side of caution, so these
numbers could easily be significantly higher.197
B. Economic Gains for Individuals
Harmonization through TTIP will also have a significant impact on
individuals. The overall impact will provide €545 to the average family in
Europe and €655 per family in the United States.198 Additionally, increased
market access and lower costs to firms will increase competition and lower
prices to everyone.199 Harmonization will also increase wages and create jobs
for both skilled and unskilled workers through an overall increase in demand
for products, increased productivity, and growth of the economy.200 It will
provide smaller companies currently situated in solely the U.S. or EU to
expand into the other’s markets previously unattainable due to the high costs
associated with divergent regulatory regimes.201 Last, harmonization will
provide investors more direct access to foreign markets as well as better
information to make decisions. Because the U.S. and the EU are already each
other’s largest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) nation, any potential increase
in access to the other’s market will have the potential to have a significant
impact on FDI.202
C. Global Political Implications
TTIP can deepen the already substantial ties that bind the U.S. and the EU
in the world’s largest economic and strategic alliance.203 TTIP, if successful,
will serve to strengthen the U.S. commitment to the EU as a key ally in a world
that is experiencing significant power shifts toward developing countries such
196 Id. at 43–44 (multiplying the baseline shares in value added times the overall value added of €120
billion for EU and €95 billion for the US).
197 See GABRIEL FELBERMAYR, ET AL., TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP):
WHO BENEFITS FROM A FREE TRADE DEAL? 24, 29 (2013) (predicting 4.95% and 3.27% increases in GDP in the
EU and U.S. respectively), available at http://www.ged-shorts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/StudyTTIP_final_ENG.pdf.
198 Economic Assessment, supra note 193, at vii.
199 Id. at 21–22 .
200 Id. at 71.
201 See supra Part III.
202 Economic Assessment, supra note 193, at 90.
203 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 3, 5.
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as China, Korea, and India.204 This is particularly important as the Obama
Administration has undergone some “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific
region and could be seen as declining significance for the EU in U.S. economic
policy.205 For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership is another large FTA
currently being negotiated between the U.S. and several countries in Southeast
Asia and North America.206
TTIP could have a major impact on multilateral trade liberalization,
allowing the two sides to define the rules in trade liberalization in the absence
of progress in other global fora such as BASEL III, the IASB, and the G-20.207
Because the U.S. and EU make up more than half of the world’s GDP,208 other
countries will be forced to move toward convergence in regulations with these
two super powers or risk being left out of two of largest markets in the
world.209 TTIP alone is projected to increase GDP in trading partners with the
U.S. and EU by almost €100 billion.210 In this specific instance, if other
countries participate in the harmonization due to the downward economic
pressure created by TTIP, then the overall global gains could far exceed these
numbers.211
D. Critiques of TTIP
However, skeptics believe that TTIP will not provide the advertised
economic and strategic gains claimed by its proponents. Trade skeptics believe
that TTIP and other trade liberalization efforts such as NAFTA and TPP lead
to an inequitable distribution of costs and benefits.212 Specifically, they suggest
the protectionist stance that free trade means adverse import competition for
certain economic sectors which causes negative employment in these
sectors.213 While this argument may hold true for certain industries, the
argument is actually about the distribution of wealth in an economy and not
about the harmful effects of trade liberalization. As almost any free-market
204

Id. at 5.
See id.
206 The White House Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The U.S. in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(Nov. 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacificpartnership.
207 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 3.
208 Id. at 3.
209 Id. at 5.
210 Economic Summary, supra note 189, at 10.
211 Id. at 10–11.
212 Id. at 9.
213 See id.
205
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economist will argue, if the overall pie is larger, then everyone can have a
larger piece.214
Global foreign relations could be seriously strained by TTIP. While the
impact on the transatlantic relationship is generally seen as a positive step
toward stronger relations, if the negotiations stall or produce results not seen as
sufficiently ambitious, further questions could be raised about the strength of
the U.S./EU relationship.215 Additionally, TTIP could solicit backlash from
those nations not included, especially if seen as a strategic move to weaken the
economic positions of China and Russia. The partnership could help in further
polarizing the political climate between these countries and the West. While
this is a fair and valid argument, the global economy is so interconnected today
that any backlash could cause severe and lasting damage to both China’s and
Russia’s economies through decreased access to the world’s major financial
markets and decreased foreign direct investment from these countries.
TTIP, as an overarching free trade agreement, has the potential to create
significant amounts of global wealth and prosperity.216 It could provide the
world with the needed stimulus to spur a new wave of economic growth and
could finally put an end to this period of slow growth caused by the financial
crisis of 2008. TTIP also has the potential to create a new standard in global
cooperation and the harmonization of regulations. More specifically, the
harmonization of financial services regulations within TTIP could provide the
framework that will be the gold standard for regulating the financial industries
worldwide. In harmonizing the U.S. system with the European system, TTIP
might just be able to create a sustainable financial industry that manages risk
and consumer protection in the correct balance, which will hopefully serve to
prevent major financial crises in the future.
CONCLUSION
Because TTIP is still in its infancy, many aspects of the agreement have yet
to be decided. This indecision includes whether to even include financial
services as part of the negotiations. Even after the seventh round of talks

214

The Coase Theorem explains that the winners can compensate the losers so that in the end everyone is
better off. This Comment will not delve into the details of the redistribution of wealth other than to say
arguments like this will not be considered as adequate arguments against trade liberalization for the purposes
of this paper.
215 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 5.
216 See supra Part VI.A.
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concluded, the U.S. still opposed including financial services regulations. The
EU continues to push for inclusion.217 Overall, whether financial services are
included, TTIP is poised to have a significant impact on the European,
American, and Global economies. That being said, financial services could
ultimately be important inclusion adding significant value to the agreement.
As noted in Part II, diverging policies and regulations in the financial
services industry can have catastrophic consequences on the global scale.
Ignoring the risk of global financial instability, there are still significant costs
associated with differing regulatory regimes. These costs, outlined in Part III,
range from duplicative costs to firms, to increased costs to the consumer, to
lost opportunities that can only be alleviated through the harmonization of
financial regulations. Additionally, as shown by the waning support for
reforms in other global forums, it will be far easier for the U.S. and the EU to
come to an agreeable arrangement in bilateral talks. This is why TTIP should
and must include financial services into the final agreement. If financial
services regulations are included, several major areas need to be addressed. As
noted in Part IV, these include but are not limited to: a single accounting
standard, closing loopholes in existing regulations, and minimizing
unnecessary risk taking by financial institutions. Even if only these three areas
are harmonized, TTIP will have gone further than any other cooperative effort
in financial regulation.
Part V presented a six point plan to achieve harmonization through TTIP.
TTIP should strive to synchronize existing regulations, provide guidelines for
initiating and developing new regulations, have a framework to implement new
regulations, have effective cross-border supervision, and enforce the
regulations fairly and effectively in both jurisdictions. Last, Part VI outlined
the impacts of including financial services in TTIP. Doing so could provide a
much needed $200 billion injection into the economies of America and
Europe. Additionally, with nearly half of the world’s GDP following the same
financial framework, the rest of the world will fall in line or risk being left
behind. The U.S. and EU will be the de facto standard setters in the financial
industry and will be able to steer in any direction they deem fit.

217 TTIP Round 7 Advanced Technical Groundwork—Most Contentious Issues Not on Table, BORDERLEX
(Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.borderlex.eu/ttip-round-7-advanced-technical-groundwork-contentious-issuestable/.
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In the age of globalization, economies have become so intertwined that a
few major bank failures triggered a worldwide recession,218 the likes of which
had not been seen since World War II.219 While there are many ongoing efforts
that are addressing global financial reform, they have not been effective in
gaining a consensus.220 As such, TTIP provides a unique opportunity for two
of the world’s superpowers to come together and bilaterally determine the
future of the global financial landscape. Financial services be included in the
TTIP negotiations to exclude them would be an error that could most likely not
be remedied in the foreseeable future. This paper has outlined the who, why,
what, where, and how, all that is left is the when, that is the $10 billion
question.
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